

1918—



—1947

Entered as 2nd class matter

MR. PAUL F. MANLEY
17917 SCHNELEY AVE.
CLEVELAND 19, OHIO

CLM-1

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXVI, No. 50

SEPTEMBER 26, 1947

REFORM U.N. INEFFECTIVE WITHOUT U.S.-U.S.S.R. SETTLEMENT

THE violent clash between the United States and Russia which marked the opening of the second session of the UN General Assembly, alarming as it seemed at first hearing, has had the effect of clearing the international atmosphere which was beginning to assume pre-hurricane tension. For it has brought out into the open, in a world forum, fundamental issues which had been hitherto discussed more or less *sub rosa* in the chancelleries of the various nations. The stormy and vituperative oration of Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky on September 18, which revealed striking ignorance both of American psychology and of the relative importance of the personalities and organs of opinion he blasted with the mercilessness displayed during his career as Soviet prosecutor, cast the United States in the role of "warmonger," bent on destroying Russia. Secretary of State Marshall's address of September 17, calm in tone but charged with firm determination to bring Russia before the bar of international judgment, cast the Soviet government in the role of sole and unremitting obstructor to the international peace.

For many of the delegates of other nations, as well as for unofficial spectators, both indictments contained some measure of truth. Many Western European countries have been troubled by the rising tide of anti-Russian sentiment in this country. Certain alarmist gestures of the American government—such as the sudden swearing in of Secretary of Defense Forrestal "because of the world situation" the day Vishinsky spoke—have caused some Americans to wonder where opposition to Russia would eventually lead. And many others besides the Americans have been increasingly disturbed by Russia's insistence on spreading its influence in neighboring countries, as well as by the activities of local Communist parties which have threatened the maintenance of middle-of-the-road governments. In the corridors of the UN

the view was widely expressed that the apprehensions of both the United States and Russia needed to be aired. Now that this has been done, it is hoped that the UN can get down to business in a more realistic, if more sober, mood.

Among the main trends revealed by the initial debates in the General Assembly, the following deserve to be noted:

1. *U.S. and U.S.S.R. at Odds on Functions of UN.* In spite of some fears that Russia might withdraw from the UN if the veto question was pressed, Russia has so far indicated just as much determination as the United States to remain in the UN, and to make it work. Each of the great powers, however, intends to do this according to its respective view of the Charter. Mr. Marshall made it clear that, in the opinion of the United States, operation of the UN has been made impossible by Russia's frequent use of the veto in the Security Council and that remedial action must be promptly taken—not through revision of the Charter, or abolition of the veto, but through "liberalization" of the veto and greater emphasis on the work of the General Assembly. He therefore proposed abandonment of the veto with respect to

In this period of turmoil and confusion, FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS objectively present the background of the news and give perspective in evaluating fast-moving events.

Among forthcoming REPORTS are:

THE OCCUPATION OF KOREA	October 15
AMERICAN POLICY IN GERMANY	November 1
THE NEW POLAND	November 15
EUROPE AND THE MARSHALL PLAN	December 1

25 cents each

Subscription \$5; to F.P.A. members, \$4.

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

matters arising under Chapter VI of the Charter concerning the pacific settlement of disputes as well as applications for membership in the UN. He also proposed the creation of the "Little Assembly," a standing committee composed of all nations members of the UN, which would sit between sessions of the General Assembly and, without impinging on the responsibilities of the Security Council, would consider various matters, notably "situations and disputes impairing friendly relations brought to its attention by member states or by the Security Council."

Mr. Vishinsky, for his part, took the view that the defects of the UN were due to the attitude of the United States and Britain which, in his opinion, have tended to act outside the UN, and have opposed measures of disarmament proposed by Russia, thus increasing fear throughout the world. He expressed categorical opposition to any alteration of the veto power, as well as to the proposal for the "Little Assembly" which, according to him, was intended to by-pass the Security Council in violation of the Charter by entrusting to the Assembly committee the functions assigned at San Francisco to the Council. After denouncing the "war-mongering" of the American press and of certain American individuals, Vishinsky demanded that the General Assembly should condemn "criminal propaganda" for war, and take measures to suppress and prohibit it.

2. *Veto Problem Symbol of Great Power Conflict.*

Delegates of the other fifty-three members of the UN expressed a wide range of views which revealed the extent to which the middle and small nations fear another war; are troubled both by the political dictatorship of Russia and the financial predominance of the United States; and are desperately seeking a way to reconcile the clashing views of the world's two great powers. So far as can be ascertained at this early stage of the discussion, most of the middle and small nations agree that the veto, which they had originally opposed with great vigor and persistence at San Francisco under the leadership of Australian Foreign Minister Evatt, should never have been demanded by the great powers, and has been overused by Russia.

At the same time, many of them point out that the United States itself, in spite of its denunciation of Russia, is not yet ready to relinquish the veto altogether, and wants to retain it with respect to Chapter VII covering action on "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression." They also note that the United States—presumably because of the American delegation's reluctance to run the gauntlet of Congressional opposition should this matter be brought up in the form of revision of the Charter—is attempting to get around the provisions of the Charter without formal revision, such as had been demanded by spokesmen, for example, of Aus-

tralia and Cuba. More important, however, many of the middle and small nations—and this point was made also by two of the veto-wielding nations, France and China—are convinced that the veto problem is merely a symbol of the conflict between the United States and Russia all over the globe, and that limitations on the use of the veto, or even its outright abolition, would not of itself remove this conflict which hampers the work of the UN at every turn.

Similarly, the American proposal for creation of the "Little Assembly" which, in spite of the qualifications with which Mr. Marshall hedged it, would in effect exercise functions comparable to those of the Security Council, represents an attempt to alter the Charter in a fundamental respect without going through the process of actual revision. The smaller nations welcome the increased importance of the General Assembly in the framework of the UN, and are convinced that it is through the process of give and take in this "town-meeting" of the world, rather than some overnight transformation of the UN, that the concept of sovereignty can be gradually whittled down. But while the smaller nations are eager to play a more influential role in the affairs of the organization than had been allotted to them under the Charter, there is greater understanding of Russia's view on this subject among some members of the UN than there appears to be in the United States. British Minister of State Hector McNeil accurately reflected the views of the majority of the delegates when in a brilliant speech on September 22 he declared that "there is real need for extending the United Nations machinery for crystallizing public opinion," but said there must be "no question of contravening the provisions of the Charter or of depriving any of the organs of the United Nations of its proper functions."

The point of view of Russia, repeatedly stated in the past, is that the great powers which bore the brunt of war must also bear the principal responsibility for the maintenance of peace, and must enjoy special powers if they are to fulfill their special functions. The Russians, who never use the word "veto" but refer to the veto power as the "unanimity rule," contend that the unanimity achieved by the Allies in time of war must be maintained now if peace is to be assured. They have not faced, or prefer to disregard, the fact that concerted action by great powers is far more difficult to achieve when the pressure of mortal danger has been removed than in the midst of war—as demonstrated by the breakup of all wartime coalitions in history. As a matter of hard practical reality, the Russians are aware that, unless they retain the veto, the U.S.S.R., at least in the foreseeable future, is bound to be outvoted in the General Assembly. This situation is peculiarly difficult to accept for a government like that in Moscow which does

not tolerate opposition at home. But even leaving this consideration aside, Russia's position might perhaps be more understandable for Americans if we bear in mind how the United States would feel if it were confronted with the prospect of being always outvoted on issues comparable to the Balkan crisis or Iran.

For the time being, the United States commands a majority of votes in the General Assembly, and Russia with its neighbors remains in a minority. Some organs of the American press have urged Russia to accept this situation gracefully and abide by majority rule, thus gradually learning democratic procedures. This advice might prove more persuasive in Moscow if Russia could assume that its actions would be henceforth judged by the United States on their merits—not, as has frequently happened during the past two years, on the assumption that Russia is always wrong and the Western powers invariably right. From the debates in the Assembly it would appear that what is urgently needed is not reform of the veto—unless the United States takes the courageous step of relinquishing the veto altogether—but a reform of the voting procedure in the Assembly, which would give greater weight to the great powers than to the small, whether the yardstick to be applied is to be size of population, wealth of natural resources, industrial potential, literacy of citizens, or other factors, alone or in combination.

3. *Need for U.S.-U.S.S.R. Settlement.* Far more important than any voting reform, however, is the need for an overall settlement between the United States and Russia. One of the assumptions which appears to guide American policy both in the UN and outside is that Russia is the acknowledged enemy of all nations, and that therefore this country will have no difficulty in aligning the world in an effort to "contain" Russia, by force if necessary. The validity of this assumption bears analysis in view of the diversity of political and economic systems existing throughout the world, and the wide range of attitudes displayed toward the United States and Russia. Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, gave a timely warning on September 20 when he pointed out that "Europe has gone definitely to the Left,"—a development many Americans have been reluctant to face. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly clear that Communism is encountering growing resistance in all countries which, while bent on some measure of socialism, are determined to preserve civil liberties.

Nor is it a foregone conclusion that the countries usually classified as being behind the "iron curtain"

are committed to Russia beyond the understandable necessities of geographic position and strategic considerations. Poland's Foreign Minister, Zygmunt Modzelewski, vigorously stressed this point on September 17 when he stated that Poland, which is in a position to export coal, key to the further reconstruction of Western Europe, intends to trade with both West and East. The negotiations of the sixteen European nations in Paris, which closed on September 22, indicate that Western Europe must seek an economic understanding with Eastern Europe if it is to reduce its dependence on the United States for food and raw materials.

Once the smoke and fire of recrimination have subsided at Flushing Meadow, it will become increasingly clear that the UN cannot hope to function at full capacity without a settlement between the United States and Russia. Washington's decision to submit the question of Korea to the General Assembly sharply revealed the inability of the two great powers to arrive at a viable accord. The General Assembly, however, cannot undertake the task of reconciling the United States and Russia except to the extent that it provides a forum where their respective grievances can be aired. Sooner or later Washington and Moscow must consider the mutual adjustments they are prepared to make—not in this area or that, but at all points where their interests impinge on each other. Is such a settlement possible?


A clue to the policy we should follow toward Russia is given by former Secretary of War Stimson in a statesmanlike article published in the October issue of *Foreign Affairs*. "Our main answer to the Russians," writes Mr. Stimson, "is not negative, nor is it in any sense anti-Russian. Our central task in dealing with the Kremlin is to demonstrate beyond the possibility of misunderstanding that freedom and prosperity, hand in hand, can be stably sustained in the western democratic world. This would be our greatest task even if no Soviet problem existed, and to the Soviet threat it is our best response. . . . The problem of Russia is thus reduced to a question of our own fitness to survive. I do not mean to belittle the Communist challenge. I only mean that the essential question is one which we should have to answer if there were not a Communist alive. Can we make freedom and prosperity real in the present world? If we can, communism is no threat. If not, with or without communism, our own civilization will ultimately fail."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXVI, No. 50, SEPTEMBER 26, 1947. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMENY, *President*; HELEN M. DAGGETT, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Six Dollars a Year
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



TRUMAN WRESTLES WITH QUESTION OF CALLING SPECIAL SESSION

When President Truman returned to the White House on September 20 from his long holiday at sea, he found Washington in puzzled disagreement over foreign policy. A sense of crisis, born of two speeches—the irreconcilable statements of Secretary of State Marshall and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky before the UN General Assembly—seemed to destroy the faint hope, nurtured in Washington until a week ago, that the United States and the Soviet Union might find some new point of agreement which would end their long, disturbing conflict for world leadership. The capital wondered uncertainly what steps the country should take under the new circumstances to safeguard the nation's interests.

RESTRAINING ROLE OF CONGRESS. The problem confronting Truman in this confused atmosphere was to decide whether he should try, against long odds, to win Congressional support for a policy which in vigor would match Marshall's words, or whether he should dilute the policy solutions advocated by Marshall and the President's other foreign advisers until they were mild enough to win the support of the House and the Senate in their present mood of economizing. As a result of the attitude taken by Congress in the past, Marshall and his colleagues lack the authority to make definite economic commitments abroad and the significant military gestures which, given the deteriorating situation of the world, might maintain American influence in those parts of Europe and Asia where at present our position seems stronger than that of Russia.

The President's problem of leadership was focused on an immediate practical question. Should he summon Congress in a special session before January? Here he is caught between the feeling of urgency which animates his cabinet, and the complacency that characterizes the attitude of many members of Congress toward international developments. In the opinion of the State Department, the special session might determine whether the United States maintains or loses the strong lead it has taken in the affairs of Western Europe. Both Marshall and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett declared during the President's absence that Congress should meet in special session to authorize the Administration to send urgently needed goods to friendly European nations which expect to run short of the necessities of life before the coming winter is far along. But Robert Taft of Ohio, Republican leader in the Senate, and Speaker Joseph Martin of Massa-

chusetts, leading Republican in the House, hold that a special session is unnecessary. Even Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, the Administration's chief foreign ally in Congress, has encouraged the complacency by his statement upon his return from the inter-American conference in Rio de Janeiro that the question of the special session was entirely up to Truman. The President has meanwhile been troubled by uncertainty as to how the calling of a special session might affect the 1948 Presidential election campaign, especially if Congress should ignore his program after it had met.

DISAGREEMENT MAKES FOR TIMIDITY. Even in sending out a call to Congress, Truman could not be confident that its members would approve suggestions which the State Department considers necessary for the development of suitable policies. The cabinet's attitude toward the opinions of the House and the Senate is already tinged with defeatism. Because it received indication last summer that Congress would object to large loans, the State Department has persuaded sixteen governments represented at the Paris Economic Conference to reduce the sum required for the economic rehabilitation of Europe from almost \$30 billion to about \$20 billion. The danger of such compromise is two-fold. Congress might not accept even a lesser sum; and the lesser sum might fail to stabilize Europe under the "Marshall Plan."

Congress and the cabinet differ, moreover, on the question of political privileges the United States should demand in return for whatever expenditures Congress permits. Irked by the frequent Russian charges that the United States habitually intervenes in others' domestic affairs, the State Department has eschewed blatant and obvious dictation to foreign governments as much as possible, although it often finds interference unavoidable. Where Germany is concerned, moreover, the State and War Departments themselves are in disagreement. The latter administers the American zone in Germany as an area isolated from the rest of the continent, while the State Department is now eager to assume responsibility for the occupation in order to integrate the German program with American policy for all of Western Europe. Hobbled by a long catalogue of disagreements in Washington over foreign affairs, the Administration has been unable to rise from timidity to consistent boldness.

BLAIR BOLLES